Part III. Japan's Right Wing: Support for War and Faulty View of Nanjing Massacre
In the face of worldwide condemnation and the verdicts by two tribunals concerning its crimes of aggression, the Japanese government should deeply reflect on its war crimes, take responsibility for the war, draw lessons from history, and begin new relationships with the countries it invaded to face the future together and maintain world peace, especially in East Asia.
For 70 years since the war, however, the Japanese government has treated in an ambiguous and vague manner the questions of the nature of the war, responsibility for the war, and numerous historical events that occurred during the war, including the Nanjing Massacre. This attitude has contributed to the ability of domestic right-wing forces in Japan to continually disseminate a distorted history of the war and rhetoric denying the Nanjing Massacre.
Over time, a number of right-wing organizations have been established in Japan, such as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, the Liberal Historical Outlook Research Association, the Association of Bereaved Members, the Association of Diet Members for Worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine Together, the Association of Members for Retribution for Martyrs, and the Historical Research Committee. Members of such organizations include descendants of war criminals or military generals, such as Itagaki Seishirō, Secretary of the Historical Research Committee and the son of war criminal Itagaki Seishirō. They also include government officials and members of both houses of the National Diet, such as Prime Ministers Mori Yoshirō and Abe Shinzō, university professors such as Fujioka Nobukatsu, and other people from all areas of society. They manufacture public opinion, write and issue a variety of publications, disseminate various erroneous viewpoints, distort history, refute the Tokyo Tribunal, continue to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and negatively impact Japan's relationships with China and other Asian countries. Some members of the Liberal Democrats—the largest party in Japanese politics and ruling the longest—were particularly dissatisfied with a speech by then Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in August 10, 1993, on the issue of Japan's war overseas. Hosokawa said, “I myself believe it was a war of aggression, a war that was wrong.”(1) Afterward, they pledged to “reconstruct the historical outlook distorted by the Tokyo Tribunal.” Two weeks later, three associations within the Liberal Democratic Party related to the Yasukuni Shrine—the Association of Members for Retribution for Martyrs, the Association of Bereaved Members, and the Association of Diet Members for Worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine Together—held a meeting and decided to establish a Historical Research Committee, choosing Yamanaka Sadanori as chairman and Itagaki Tadashi as secretary. In the name of summarizing the history of the Greater East Asia War, they invited 19 right-wing scholars and members of the National Diet to make presentations. Diet members attended the discussion forum a total of 1,116 times. The speakers elaborated on and aired Japanese right-wing views denying their war of aggression on foreign soil, systematically, comprehensively, and in a focused manner. The reports of the 19 right-wing scholars were collected in a book compiled by the Historical Research Committee, entitled Daitō-a sensō no sōkatsu (Summary of the Greater East Asia War) (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1995). The Xinhua Press organized a translation into Chinese and, in December 1997, the book was published in China. The views expressed therein are summarized below.
1. Glorification of Aggression
With regard to the Russo-Japanese War, the right-wing Japanese scholars stated that, “It is due to the presence of a militarized Japan that the Russo-Japanese War broke out, and due to the Russo-Japanese War that Asia was saved. If there were no militarism in Japan, then the whole of Asia would have collapsed and completely disintegrated,” and that, “The Russo-Japanese War was not only a war to save Asia, but also a war of self-defense for Japan.”(2)
Addressing Japan's foreign expansion, they asserted that Japan, “due to its lack of land and resources, requested that other countries guarantee the right to survival of Japanese people,” and regarding the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, “…only in order to survive did the Japanese people demand the right to lease land in southern Manchuria, engage in industrial, commercial, and agriculture activities, and travel and live...these requirements were not excessive.” In addition, the scholars said that, “In order to address its annual increase in population of one million, it was natural for Japan to take advantage of this new world of Manchuria and Mongolia. The Japanese were forced by the international circumstances around them to turn their attention toward Manchuria.”(3)
Concerning Japan's aggression in northeast China, one scholar stated, “The Manchurian Incident was said to be aggression against China; however, I must raise a major objection to this. Was Manchuria part of Chinese territory or not? This remains a big question. I believe that Manchuria was not part of Chinese territory. It is even so from an historical point of view,” and that, “The Manchurian Incident resulted in Manchuria becoming very stable, with a pace of development several times that of China.”(4)
With regard to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the right-wing scholars asserted that, “This was instigated by the radical elements of the Communist system and occurred by happenstance.” They asked, “Who were the murderers? It is said that it was Liu Shaoqi, or Zhang Kexia, a Communist hidden in the Chinese army, under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi.” They also stated that, “It was the least possible that Japan instigated it; nobody believes that the Japanese did it...This incident was undoubtedly instigated by the Chinese army,” and that, “Japan demonstrated much forbearance on the question of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, trying hard to avoid the escalation of the incident.” In addition, they queried, “Was it Japan or China that escalated the Marco Polo Bridge Incident into the China Incident?(5) This should be clear.”(6)
Concerning the “Greater East Asia War,” these right-wing scholars stated, “Japan hoped all along to build an Asian self-sufficiency sphere with coexistence and co-prosperity among Japan, Manchuria, and China, and to establish an independent economy. From there it would expand to form a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” They also said that, “Without the Greater East Asia War, Southeast Asian countries might have had to succumb to colonial rule for a rather long period,” that “Japan wanted to liberate Asia,” and that, “It was thanks to Japan that Southeast Asian countries were able to achieve independence; on the contrary, they should express their gratitude to Japan, and could provide assistance to Japan, which made a tremendous sacrifice.” They further asserted that, “Japan fought to protect and liberate Asia from aggression…. It was because of Japan's desperate battle that humanity has made great progress, from an era of the law of the jungle to an era of equal coexistence,” and that, “Japan has made unprecedented international contributions as a nation; the Japanese people are a just people.”(7)
2. Denial of Nanjing Massacre
The right-wing Japanese scholars stated in their Summary that, “The Nanjing Massacre appeared suddenly during the Tokyo Tribunal…. Such a thing as the so-called Nanjing Massacre could not exist....Today, the ‘Nanjing Massacre’ is even more unlikely to exist.” They said that, “A man named Hora Tomio of Waseda University...said that ‘seventy or eighty thousand citizens, more than 200,000 soldiers and civilians added together’ (were killed). It is obvious at a glance that such a thing is made up. To say that seventy or eighty thousand citizens were killed, then how were they killed?” and that, “Under such circumstance, as many as 70,000 or 80,000 citizens, how could they be killed? It is simply nonsense.” They asserted that, “If 200,000 people were killed, the bodies would pile up in the city of Nanjing.”(8)
The scholars also stated, “The Nanjing government and Chiang Kai-shek ordered the fabrication of the Nanjing Massacre at the time, and allowed people to declare their victim status. But, in fact, there was no such thing…. If you ask who created the Nanjing Massacre, it can be said that its raw materials were manufactured by the Nanjing government. Later, the Tokyo trial verdicts arrived at this highest figure of 200,000.”(9) They also said, “Because of the fabricated lie of the Nanjing Massacre, General Matsui [Iwane—Ed.] was unjustly sentenced to death by hanging by the Tokyo Tribunal….(10) So, the Nanjing Incident was therefore fabricated. The Nanjing Incident was fabricated as a so-called large massacre for the Tokyo trials.”(11)
Japan's right-wing scholars also found so-called evidence to claim that the events of the Nanjing Massacre did not take place. They stated, for example, “When Nanjing fell on December 13, 120 so-called journalists had entered the city to conduct interviews, including photographers, newspaper reporters, and magazine reporters [In fact, all of them were Japanese.—Ed.]...not one of them saw a scene of bloody carnage. No one saw a massacre scene.”(12) They added that the Kuomintang and Communist Party newspapers and magazines, “no matter how one looks for it, did not write of the existence of the Nanjing Massacre.”(13)
Japanese right-wing forces have not limited themselves to widely disseminating commentary negating the aggressive nature of the war, denying the existence of the facts of the Nanjing Massacre, and discrediting the justice and fairness of the Tokyo Tribunal. They have also written books to expound upon their fallacious arguments, the most representative of which are Suzuki Akira's Nankin Daigyakusatsu no maboroshi (The illusion of the Nanjing Massacre) (Tokyo: Bungeishunju Ltd., 1973), “Nankin Gyakusatsu” no kyōko (The Fabrication of the “Nanjing Massacre”) by Tanaka Masaaki (Tokyo: Kyobunsha, 1984), Fuji Nobuo's “Nankin daigyakusatsu” ha kō shite tsukurareta (How the “Nanjing Massacre” was contrived) (Tokyo: Tentensha, 1995), and “Nankin Gyakusatsu” no tettei kenshō (Thorough verification of the “Nanjing Massacre”) by Higashinakano Osamichi (Tentensha, 1998).
It has been nearly 70 years since World War II and the Japanese war of aggression against China ended. Why does an aggressive historical outlook persist within Japan, and why do right-wing forces that glorify aggression increasingly run rampant in that country? Why is the Japanese government unable to account for its war crimes in good faith, take a clear position assuming responsibility for the war, and make a sincere apology to the nations affected? The Japanese government continually wavers back and forth, and some of its politicians spread fallacies distorting historical facts, thereby contributing to the anti-China activities of the right-wing forces and increasing the sense of distrust between the two peoples. We believe that there are four very complex historical and practical reasons for the existence of this political phenomenon in Japan.(14)
First, after the end of World War II, the two camps of capitalism and socialism gradually prevailed internationally. The US-led forces of Western capitalism made opposing the Soviet Union and countering communism their top foreign relations priority. Following the adjustment and realignment of the region's political forces, the United States developed a new policy toward Asia. Focusing on the strategic situation in the Far East and the Pacific, the United States elevated the hostile wartime US-Japan relationship to an alliance, strongly supported Japan, and took advantage of Japan's power to confront the communist and socialist camp. To this end, the United States adopted a policy different from its treatment of Germany and implemented a principle of exclusive occupation of Japan; the US therefore could not engage in a conscientious or complete accounting of Japanese militarist crimes, and even condoned the policies adopted by some militarists. For example, in November 1950, the war criminal Shigemitsu Mamoru was released before the end of his sentence, after maneuvering by the United States, and once again served as Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Not only was there no pursuit of accountability or criticism of Emperor Hirohito, who was primarily responsible for the war of aggression, but the imperial system itself was also preserved. Later, following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States returned to Asia, further strengthened its Asia policy, and made containment of the emerging China the top military and political game in the Asia-Pacific region. In this political contest, Japan followed the lead of the United States and, taking advantage of its backing, continued to cause trouble in terms of its China policy and treatment of historical issues between China and Japan. This has been an international factor preventing deep introspection concerning Japan's war crimes.
Second, Japan is unable to correctly address the victimized Asian nations and has an especially tolerant policy toward the crimes of Japanese militarists against the Chinese government and people. Beginning in 1874, Japan repeatedly invaded China; it invaded Taiwan, launched the First Sino-Japanese War, forced China to sign unequal treaties, compelled China to cede territory and pay reparations, and caused the Chinese people to suffer countless losses of life and property. China was the greatest victim of Japan's 14-year war of aggression (the Second Sino-Japanese War), and the Chinese people suffered a disastrous calamity. The Chinese people have the right and reason to recover losses from Japan for the war. But the Chinese government considered that China and Japan are near neighbors across a narrow strip of water, and that the two peoples should live in friendship for many generations. With great generosity, China therefore took the initiative to waive the war reparations that Japan rightfully owed to China. Some people in Japan, however, are unable to correctly understand the severe disaster that the war brought to the Chinese people, and instead paint themselves as the victims of the war. The annual commemorations of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima have given the Japanese people an incorrect impression. A considerable number of ordinary Japanese believe that Japan was a victim of the war, lack understanding of the Chinese government's tolerant policy emphasizing Sino-Japanese friendship, and are therefore unable to fully recognize the dangers of Japanese militarism. Meanwhile, the early differences between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties in Taiwan and Mainland China concerning the War of Resistance and policies toward Japan have also made it more difficult for the Japanese government to reflect on its responsibility for the war.
Third, moral values distorted under traditional Japanese culture became spiritual shackles preventing Japan from admitting to its war crimes. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese Constitution provided that its emperor was the supreme ruler of the Empire of Japan, a descendant of Amaterasu, the creator of the Japanese nation, and the incarnation of the divine right. Under the influence of such a theocratic ideology, the majority of people in Japan believed without doubt that “Japan is a divine land incomparable among all nations.” At the same time, they believed that, “Although His Majesty the Emperor is human, he embodies the divine,” and therefore, “with regard to foreigners, to come under the rule of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan is a great blessing.” In addition, they were taught that, “The war with China was a holy war to allow the Chinese people to attain happiness.” For a long period, the Japanese people received an imperialist and nationalist education, which cultivated a concept of blind obedience.(15) The spirit of bushidō (the way of the warrior) was preached widely in Japan, advocating the sacrifice of one's life for the empire. Beginning in the 1920s, this spirit and Western fascism were combined to become the spiritual foundation for Japanese militarists to launch a war of aggression overseas, pledging their lives and swearing allegiance to the emperor. Under such conceptual guidance, many young Japanese soldiers felt incomparably proud of participating in the so-called “holy war” and being able to give their lives in allegiance to the emperor, for which their souls would enter the Yasukuni Shrine to become “protector deities of the nation.” War criminals who waged the war of aggression and were sentenced to death by the IMTFE have been glorified as “protector deities of the nation” and are regarded by the Japanese right wing as national heroes. Based on this understanding, Japan's right-wing forces naturally refuse to admit to the war crimes and will not criticize the nation's militarism.
Historically, Japan had little communication or exchange with the outside world. Over time, the country developed a unitary ethnic structure known as the Yamato People, with a narrow ethnic consciousness in which the Yamato People were viewed as a superior race. The nation has felt contempt for neighboring countries, especially China, and Japan therefore is unable to face the world or the people of Asia with an open mindset. Japan possesses a small national territory, lacks resources, and has a large population. Particularly after the Meiji Restoration prompted the rapid development of Japan's capitalist economy, they openly claimed that outward expansion was a reasonable demand in order to survive, and made launching a foreign war a key to the normal development of the country. Japan is reluctant to admit that such gangster logic and deeply ingrained expansionist ideology, self-proclaimed as reasonable, are the ideological roots and historical factors behind its war and crimes of aggression.
Fourth, there are also complex practical reasons why the Japanese do not want to adopt a clear and profound attitude of introspection. Japan is a major world economy. In spite of its economic downturn for the past decade or more, as well as the triple disaster of the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear leak, the Japanese economy remains ranked third in the world. As a major economic power, Japan impacts not only the Asian but also the world economy. It is also actively seeking to become a military and political power, and desires to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Japan has insufficient forces, but is very strong in terms of military equipment. By upgrading the status of its Self-Defense Forces, Japan seeks to extend its military force overseas. Japan is concerned about China's development and increasing strength, and is extremely worried about the enhancement of China's military force, believing that China will be its greatest adversary in the future. In terms of China policy, the Japanese government and the majority of influential politicians are not friendly enough toward China and have a skeptical or even hostile attitude. In 2011, the United States gradually shifted its overall strategic direction toward Asia in an attempt to further curb China. Japan is a principal component of the US strategy. Japan was willing to expand the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty to Taiwan, does not expressly support or oppose Taiwan's independence, and is even creating friction in the East and South China Seas, provoking a territorial dispute between Japan and China on the Diaoyu Islands issue, leading to the continual deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. All of these factors directly impact Japan's accurate understanding of historical issues.
The complexity of Sino-Japanese relations is evident: historical issues, practical factors, political awareness, and ideological origins are intertwined, leading to differences between China and the Japanese right wing that will be difficult to reverse in the short term. It is nearly impossible to expect a change in the aggressive historical outlook of some right-wing Japanese politicians. The sacred mission incumbent upon historians is to clarify the historical facts, lay out the historical truth before the world, and offer an accurate judgment and understanding.
(1) Margot S. Strom, Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior (Brookline, MA: Facing History and Ourselves Foundation, 1994), 488.
(2) Historical Research Committee, ed., Da Dongya Zhanzheng de zonglun [Summary of the Greater East Asia War], translated into Chinese by Dong Ying (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1997), 7.
(3) Historical Research Committee, ed., Da Dongya Zhanzheng de zonglun [Summary of the Greater East Asia War], translated into Chinese by Dong Ying (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 1997), 12, 19.
(4) Ibid., 19—21.
(5) “China Incident” is a Japanese term for the Second Sino-Japanese War.—Trans.
(6) Historical Research Committee, Greater East Asia War, 23—25.
(7) Ibid., 51, 53, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79.
(8) Historical Research Committee, Greater East Asia War, 115—117.
(9) Ibid., 126—127.
(10) Ibid., 351.
(11) Ibid., 354.
(12) Ibid., 361.
(13) Ibid., 362.
(14) For this analysis, see Zhang Xianwen, ed., “Zonglun” [Overview], in Nanjing Da Tusha shiliaoji [Nanjing Massacre historical collection] (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing, Ltd., 2005—2010).
(15) Wakatsuki Yasuo, Nihon no sensōsekinin [Japan's war responsibility], translated into Chinese by Zhao Zirui et al. as Riben de zhanzheng zeren (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1999), from the preface to the Chinese edition.